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“GIVE THEM A DAM BREAK!” PROTECTING THE NGÄBE
BUGLÉ COMMUNITY OF PANAMA WITH CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM SAFEGUARDS TO PROMOTE
CULTURALLY SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT
Cindy Campbell*
INTRODUCTION
Nestled along the banks of the Tabasará River is Panama’s largest
indigenous community, the Ngäbe-Buglé 1 (pronounced naw-bey booglay)2 who occupy one of the nation’s comarcas3 legally reserved to them
by the government.4 For the most part, the Ngäbe live in the minimalist
tradition of farming, fishing, and hunting.5 Their lives are simple and, like

* J.D. Candidate, Florida A&M University College of Law, Spring 2015. Ms. Campbell
also holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Central Florida (2011). My
sincerest gratitude and warmest regards to the following: my family for their sacrifice and
constant encouragement; Professor Randall S. Abate for his support, guidance, and for
consistently challenging me to soar to new heights; and the American Indian Law Journal
staff for your hard work.
1

This indigenous community was originally known as the Guaymi and was also known as
the Ngöbe who have a close affiliation with the Buglé. Together, this indigenous group is
collectively known as the Ngäbe-Buglé. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous
Peoples - Panama : Guaymi (Ngöbe-Buglé), MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L, (Dec.
2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/49749cce1e.html (last visited May 14, 2014).
[hereinafter World Directory].
2
Stephen Flohr, Eco-Tourism As Indigenous Resistance In Panama, W AGING
NONVIOLENCE (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/eco-tourism-as-indigenous-resistance-inpanama/(last visited May 14, 2014).
3
See World Directory, supra note 1 (stating that a comarca is an indigenous reserve); but
see Stefanie Wickstrom, The Politics of Development in Indigenous Panama, 30 LATIN
AM. PERSP. 43, 68 (2003), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3185059 (last visited
May 14, 2014) (stating “reserves were granted before the concept of comarca came into
being).
4
World Directory, supra note 1.
5
The Natives of Chiriqui: The History of the Ngobe-Bugle Tribe, THE AMBLER,
http://amble.com/ambler/2011/08/the-natives-of-chiriqui-the-history-of-the-Ngöbe-bugletribe/(last visited May 14, 2014).
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other indigenous communities, their continued survival is inextricably tied
to their land.6
Recently disrupting their tranquil existence is the incessant sound
of heavy machinery in the distance. The Ngäbe’s way of life is threatened
by the ongoing construction of the Barro Blanco dam.7 This dam would
displace the Ngäbe by threatening to flood several homes, schools, and
farms.8 The free-flowing Tabasará with its abundant fish and crustaceans
would be converted into a pool of standing water, breeding bacteria,
mosquitos and, ultimately, disease. 9 Unfortunately, Barro Blanco is only
one in a series of many hydroelectric projects endangering the Ngäbe way
of life.10
As one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies, Panama is
moving forward with the Barro Blanco and similar hydroelectric projects to
6

Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Commonality Among Unique Indigenous
Communities: An Introduction to Climate Change and Its Impacts on Indigenous People,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES 4 (2013)
(quoting S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1
(2009) (explaining that indigenous people include a diverse group of communities who
are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands on which they
live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of
society living on the same lands or in close proximity. And they are peoples in that they
comprise distinct communities within a continuity of existence and identity that links them
to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.).
7
Richard Arghiris, In Defence of the Rio Tabasara, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (Jun. 15,
2011), http://intercontinentalcry.org/in-defence-of-the-rio-tabasara/ (last visited May 19,
2014); see also Caterina Amicucci, et. al., Dire Straits: EIB Investments in Panama and
Their Impacts on Indigenous Communities, Workers and the Environment, COUNTER
BALANCE, 22 (May 2011), available at http://www.counterbalance-eib.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/PanamaReport_WEB.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014) (stating
that the project would flood approximately 467 acres of land belonging to the NgöbeBugle). [hereinafter Dire Straits].
8
Jennifer Kennedy, Tabasará River Communities Struggle to Halt Panamanian Dam
Project, CORPW ATCH, (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15861
(last visited May 19, 2014).
9
Id.
10
Id.; see also UN Representative on Indigenous Peoples Asked to Investigate Human
Rights Violations Caused by Panama's Barro Blanco Dam, THE CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL.
LAW (June 18, 2013),
http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/BarroBlanco_18Jun2013.html (last visited May 19,
2014) [hereinafter UN Special Rapporteur] (discussing NGO’s urging the UN Special
Rapporteur to investigate human rights violations as a result of the Barro Blanco dam).
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meet the country’s rising demand for electricity. 11 Consequently, the rights
of the Ngäbe are a mere afterthought. 12 Although Panama expressed
assurances that Ngäbe lands would be protected, portions of the land
have already been expropriated for the development of the dam without
the Ngäbe’s consent, contrary to Panamanian law.13 Indeed, by mid-2014
the dam may be complete unless construction is halted.14 Specifically, Ley
10 de 1997 and its progeny protect indigenous lands in Panama and
prohibit such takings without the indigenous community’s consent.
However, indigenous rights often take a back seat to Panama’s hunger for
socioeconomic growth.15
In addition to domestic protections, there are international laws that
protect indigenous rights, such as the International Labour Organization
Convention No. 169 (ILO 169) and the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP). The Barro Blanco project violates
international law because the Ngäbe’s right to free, prior, and informed
consent was not observed. 16 Despite these human rights violations,
projects like the Barro Blanco are registered under the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol.17 While there are
many organizations assisting the Ngäbe in fighting for their protections,
construction of the Barro Blanco dam and other similar projects persists
because there is no way for the indigenous community to formally register
11

Nick Swyter, The Ngäbe Buglé: Panama’s Vocal Minority, THE PULITZER CTR. ON CRISIS
REPORTING, (July 13, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/projects/central-america-panamangäbe-buglé-barro-blanco-hydroelectric-dam-tabasará-river-infrastructure-sustainable
(last visited May 19, 2014).
12
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 45.
13
John Ahni Schertow, Panama: Indigenous Movement Deeply Concerned About the
Barro Blanco Dam, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (May 7, 2011),
https://intercontinentalcry.org/panama-indigenous-movement-deeply-concerned-aboutthe-barro-blanco-dam/(last visited May 19, 2014).
14
Letter from Tania Arosemena Bodero, Dir. of Legal Affairs CIAM, et. al. to Mr. S.
James Anaya, UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People (June 14,
2013), available at http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/ANAYAFINAL-FINAL-FINAL-LA2.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014)[ [hereinafter Letter].
15
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 45.
16
See generally Letter, supra note 14.
17
Registered as Project 3237 under the CDM. Project 3237: Barro Blanco Hydroelectric
Power Plant Project, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/AENOR1261468057.59/view (last visited May 19, 2014)
[hereinafter Project 3237].
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its complaints under the CDM because the CDM does allow public
comments outside of the thirty-day comment period.18
Part I of this article discusses the effects of hydroelectric power
projects such as the Barro Blanco Dam on the Ngäbe. It examines how
the Panamanian government’s exploitation of indigenous lands places the
Ngäbe in jeopardy of losing significant portions of their territory to
hydroelectric projects. It also explores the Panamanian government’s
desire to increase its energy production through hydroelectric projects, the
effects of these projects on indigenous communities, and the tension
created by each party’s demands. Part II analyzes existing international
and domestic protections for indigenous peoples and the failure of each to
shield the Ngäbe from human rights violations; specifically, violation of
their right to free, prior, and informed consent. Part III examines the
CDM’s processes, its shortcomings with regard to the registration process,
and how these deficiencies facilitate human rights violations.
Part IV proposes three possible remedies to assist the Ngäbe. First,
the existing CDM standards should be adjusted to predicate registration
on current and continued compliance with indigenous human rights
protections that comport with international and domestic law. Second, an
access to justice mechanism should be established through which
indigenous peoples and other affected parties can register complaints and
report violations of CDM standards. Finally, Panama should embrace
indigenous knowledge as a valuable instrument that could provide
traditional solutions to contemporary problems.

18

UN Special Rapporteur, supra note 10; see also Groups Support Challenge to Dam
Project in Panama for Violating Indigenous Rights, THE CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW , (Aug.
29, 2013), http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/BarroBlanco_29Aug2013.html (last
visited May 14, 2014)(stating several NGO’s including The Center for International
Environmental Law, Earthjustice, the Interamerican Association for Environmental
Defense (AIDA), and Earthjustice, recently supported an amicus brief filed by the
Environmental Advocacy Center, Panamá (CIAM) in the Panama Supreme Court of
Justice arguing that the Ngäbe’s right to free, prior, and informed consent was violated
when they were not adequately consulted regarding the Barro Blanco dam).
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I.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CULTURAL TRADITION AND DEVELOPMENT

The Ngäbe-Buglé are an indigenous community struggling for
survival amidst the continued advancement of hydroelectric projects
threatening to displace them from lands legally granted to them by the
government of Panama. 19 While Panama’s need to produce its own
electricity compels the government to find alternatives to meet this need, 20
the consequences of choosing hydroelectric projects to generate
electricity imperil the land and culture of the Ngäbe community.21
A.

The Ngäbe-Buglé of Panama

El Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé is located in western Panama and is
comprised of lands from the Bocas Del Toro, Chiriquí, and Veraguas
provinces. 22 The comarca’s creation was the result of a protracted
political battle between the indigenous community and the Panamanian
government. 23
The Ngäbe have lived in western Panama for
approximately 500 years and during this time they consistently fought to
have clearly demarcated boundaries to prevent intrusion, exploitation, or
misappropriation of their lands. 24 Although the Ngäbe occupied a
substantial portion of western Panama, cattle ranchers, coffee growers,

19

Nick Swyter, Panama: Dam Promises or Dam Lies, THE PULITZER CTR. ON CRISIS
REPORTING, (Aug.15, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-america-panamangäbe-buglé-indigenous-tribe-hydroelectric-dam-tabasará-river-company-genisa-barroblanco (last visited May 19, 2014).
20
Id.; see also Panama Seeks Solutions to Drought-Driven Energy Crisis, POWER
ENGINEERING INT’L, (May 21, 2013),
http://www.powerengineeringint.com/articles/2013/05/panama-seeks-solutions-todrought-driven-energy-crisis.html (last visited May 19, 2014).
21
Swyter, supra note 19.
22
Comarca Ngäbe Bugle, RECONTOUR S.A.,
http://reconturpanama.com/en/locations/comarca-Ngöbe-bugle (last visited May 14,
2014).
23
See generally Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 55-58.
24
Fran del Rosario, This Land is Our Land: The Ngöbe Struggle for Land, 6 (Oct. 1,
2011) (unpublished Independent Study Project) (on file with SIT Graduate Institute as
Paper 1178), available at
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2197&context=isp_collection
(last visited May 19, 2014).
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and banana plantations gradually displaced the Ngäbe.25 In response, the
Ngäbe mobilized as a collective unit to defend their lands. 26
Amidst a burgeoning movement that would reinforce the Ngäbe’s
cultural identity and Latin America’s interest in fostering positive relations
with its indigenous peoples, the Panamanian government took initial steps
to further this interest. 27 According to one author, “[f]or the first time in
Panamanian history, the Panamanian Constitution of 1972 declared that
indigenous lands must be given as property, and not under some type of
usufruct arrangement.” 28 To that end, special laws established land
rights—one for each indigenous group—governed by executive decree,
creating an autonomous region, and giving the people freedom to control
the use of their lands.29 Moreover, the Ngäbe—who had been protesting
and petitioning for over 40 years—were finally granted a comarca, which
was created by Panama Ley 10 de 1997 (Ley 10).30
Ley 10 only granted the Ngäbe half of the land they requested,31
leaving a significant portion of the people to live outside the territory. 32
The text of Ley 10 refers to additional lands that were supposed to be
25

John R. Bort & Philip D. Young, The Ngöbe of Western Panama, in 123 ENDANGERED
PEOPLES OF LATIN AMERICA: STRUGGLES TO SURVIVE AND THRIVE 123 (2001).
26
The Ngäbe organized in response to the teachings of Mama Chi, who emphasized the
importance of traditional Ngäbe rituals and their unique cultural identity. Wickstrom, supra
note 3, at 55-56.
27
Roque Roldán Ortega, Models for Recognizing Indigenous Land Rights in Latin
America, W ORLD BANK, (Oct. 2004),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GLOBALENVIRONMENTFACILITYGEFOPERATION
S/Resources/Publications-Presentations/Biopublication2005ModelsforRecognizing.pdf
(last visited May 19, 2014).
28
Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a usufruct is the right of using and enjoying,
usually for life, the property belonging to another. Thus, when the usufruct ended, the
property would revert back to the original owner. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (2009).
This is an important distinction to make because the comarca status grants indigenous
peoples collective ownership to the reserved lands.
29
Id.
30
Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, COMARCANGOBEBUGLE.COM,
http://comarcangobebugle.com/2011/03/the-comarca-Ngöbe-bugle/ (last visited May 19,
2014); see also Wickstrom supra note 3, at 58 (stating the Ngöbe took measures such as
marching and hunger strikes to gain the attention of the government and the general
public).
31
The Ngöbe were granted a comarca for 650,000 hectares (or 1,495,000 acres).
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50.
32
World Directory, supra note 1.
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annexed to the Ngäbe-Buglé comarca; however, this has not been done.33
Thus, the Ngäbe persist in seeking the legal demarcation of the annexed
areas. 34 The significance of demarcation lies in the fact that as the
government yields to pressure from speculators and investors wanting to
develop and commercialize the area, the Ngäbe continue to suffer a
constant loss of lands that were originally subject to annexation.35
Despite having less land than originally intended, the Ngäbe
continue to practice traditional subsistence survival, which includes slashand-burn agriculture. 36 Their major produce includes corn, beans, rice,
bananas, and root vegetables. 37 Slash-and-burn agriculture was a
sustainable means of agriculture until the 1960s. 38 However, over the
years, the Ngäbe population increased exponentially, further underscoring
their need to protect the lands they have and to receive the lands
promised them in Ley 10. 39 The growing population caused an
intensification of the demand for agriculture. 40 Some Ngäbe turned to
temporary labor outside the comarca to meet their needs, which
undermines the Ngäbe’s communal agricultural practices.41 Culturally, the
Ngäbe have a communal (collective) view of rights; thus to the Ngäbe,
33

The Inspection Panel, Investigation Report of Panama: Land Administration Project
(Loan No. 7045-PAN), W ORLDBANK, xv (Sept. 16, 2010), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/09/21/000350881
_20100921113336/Rendered/PDF/565650IPR0P0501S0RQ0091010and009104.pdf (last
visited May 19 2014).
34
del Rosario, supra note 24, at 16.
35
Id.; see further discussion on Ley 10 infra Part II.
36
Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 124; “Slash-and-burn” farming is a form of shifting
agriculture where the natural vegetation is cut down and burned as a method of clearing
the land for cultivation. When the plot becomes infertile, the farmer moves to a new fresh
plot. This process is repeated over and over. “Slash-and-burn” is also known as
“swidden” or “shifting” agriculture. What is Slash and Burn Farming?, RAINFOREST SAVER,
http://www.rainforestsaver.org/what-slash-and-burn-farming (last visited May 14, 2014).
37
Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 124.
38
Id. at 127.
39
Resultados Finales Básicos, CONTRALORÍA GENERAL DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSO,
http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/inec/Publicaciones/Publicaciones.aspx?ID_SUBCATEGOR
IA=59&ID_PUBLICACION=360&ID_IDIOMA=1&ID_CATEGORIA=13(last visited May 19,
2014) (Click on “Cuadro 1”) (showing that according to Panama’s census bureau, the
Ngöbe totaled 72,450 in 1990, 110,0807 in 2000, and 156,747 in 2010).
40
See Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 127 (discussing the increased Ngäbe population).
41
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50.
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collective rights come first and are held in higher esteem than individual
rights. 42 The significance of communal lands is best understood by the
statement of one Ngöbe resident in response to land titling initiatives:
“Ngöbe land is like a house. You cannot just sell your room without
consulting your parents. However, a title gives you the right to do just
that.”43
In addition to agriculture, the Ngäbe also raise livestock. 44 The
Ngäbe depend on domestic animals such as cattle, pigs, and chicken.
They supplement their diets by hunting and fishing. 45 Varied species of
fish and shrimp are very important sources of dietary protein for the Ngäbe
people. 46 The completion of the Barro Blanco dam would destroy the
fragile ecosystem of the Tabasará River. In addition to flooding the nearby
agriculture, the dam would destroy the population of migratory fish and the
abundant shrimp found in the river. 47 In fact, this dam would create a
barrier with an entirely new reservoir lake resulting in an extremely
different environment.48
This is not the first time the Ngäbe have had to defend their lands
from development projects. In fact, Barro Blanco is one of many
hydroelectric projects to infringe on indigenous territory.49 In reviewing the
42

del Rosario, supra note 24, at 14.
Id.
44
Bort & Young, supra note 25, at 124.
45
Id.
46
Philip D. Young, Ngöbe Communities in the Vicinity of Proposed Chan 75 Hydroelectric
Damn in Changuinola River, BURICA PRESS (Apr. 10, 2008),
http://burica.wordpress.com/2008/04/10/ngobe-communities-in-the-vicinity-of-proposedchan-75-hydroelectric-damn-in-changuinola-river/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
47
Panama: Time Is Running Out For Tabasará Communities, RAINFOREST RESCUE (Mar.
15, 2013), http://www.rainforest-rescue.org/news/4992/panama-time-is-running-out-fortabasara-communities (last visited May 19, 2014).
48
Dr. William O. McLarney, et. al., The Threat to Biodiversity and Ecosystem Function of
Proposed Hydroelectric Dams in the La Amistad World Heritage Site, Panama And Costa
Rica, UNESCO W ORLD HERITAGE COMM., 13 (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/international/pdfs/UNESCO_PDF.pdf (last
visited May 19, 2014).
49
Report from Werner Kiene, Compliance Review Panel Chairperson to Board of
Executive Directors of the Inter-American Development Bank, 49 (Aug. 27, 2012) (on file
with The Independent Consultation
and Investigation Mechanism), available at http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Final-MICI-Report.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
43

554

boundaries of the Ngäbe-Buglé comarca, there are numerous plans
affecting each of its three provincial locations, forming a collective of
projects threatening to further shrink the Ngäbe living area. 50 In the
Chiriqui province alone, there are at least nineteen dams that are either
have built or are in progress.51
In 1981, Panama authorized the development of Tabasara I, which
would have been used to supply power to the Cerro Colorado Copper
Mining Project.52 However, they eventually cancelled the project after the
community through widespread opposition and protests rejected it.53 Later
in 1997, a conglomerate organized to develop the Tabasará I and
Tabasará II hydroelectric dams. 54 The communities surrounding the
Tabasará River became aware of the project during the Environmental
Impact Studies and quickly began to mobilize. 55 In response, they created
an indigenous resistance group, El Movimiento 10 de Abril (M10), to
defend the Ngäbe’s rights and to stand against the building of a dam
across the Tabasará.56 Ultimately, the Panamanian government cancelled
the project, but the threat of dam construction in the area persisted.

50

Id.
Id.
52
Britnae Purdy, Ignoring FPIC Leads to 30 Years of Protest, Violence, and Profit-Loss in
Panama, FIRST PEOPLES W ORLDWIDE, (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://firstpeoples.org/wp/tag/tabasara-river/ (last visited May 19, 2014); see also
Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 50 (stating an abundance of copper was discovered under
Cerro Colorado (part of Ngöbe lands) and after much exploration the government moved
forward with granting mining concessions to reap the benefit of revenue flowing from the
project).
53
Id.
54
Chronology of Events for Barro Blanco Dam (Panama), INT’L RIVERS, (May 2, 2013),
http://www.internationalrivers.org/chronology-of-events-for-barro-blanco-dam-panama
(last visited May 19, 2014).
55
Id.
56
Nick Swyter, Panama: The Indigenous Activists Who Paralyzed a Nation, PULITZER
CTR. ON CRISIS REPORTING, (July 30, 2013), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/centralamerica-panama-comarca-ngäbe-buglé-barro-blanco-genisa-hydroelectric-damtabasará-river-infrastructure-sustainable-indigenous-legal-activist-mine; see FAQ’s,
GENISA, http://www.genisa.com.pa/en/faqs/ (last visited May 14, 2014) (addressing the
suggestion that Barro Blanco is a revival of the Tabasara I project, but Generadora del
Itsmo, S.A. (GENISA), the developer undertaking Barro Blanco project, denies this
allegation and insists that Barro Blanco has no relation with the Tabasara I project); see
also Chronology of Events for Barro Blanco Dam (Panama), supra note 54 (stating
51
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The Ngäbe were also threatened with the completion of the
Changuinola 1 (Chan 75) hydroelectric project planned in the Boca del
Toro province on the Changuinola River.57 This particular project was the
subject of ongoing litigation involving indigenous opposition and abuses of
the Ngäbe people by the government and AES Corporation. 58 The dam
threatened to displace more than 1,000 Ngäbe people and destroy
essential resources such as fish and shrimp, which would adversely affect
the existence of certain wildlife. 59 The Ngäbe were also subject to
numerous acts of violence, coercion, manipulation, and lies to advance
the project.60 After numerous attempts to halt the project, Chan 75 was
completed in 2011 and, as predicted, approximately 1,000 people (180
Ngäbe families) were displaced.61 Though AES Corporation promised to
resettle the affected indigenous communities prior to completion, the
proposed resettlement communities have not been completed, leaving the
families to live in poor facilities with no land to cultivate for their survival.62

GENISA received funding for Barro Blanco from FMO of Netherlands, DEG of Germany,
and EIB; however, GENISA withdrew its loan application from EIB due to mounting
pressure on EIB from NGO’s and those funds were replaced by funding from Central
American Bank of Economic Integration (CABEI)).
57
See ACD Comments on Changuinola 1 (Chan 75) Large Hydro Project (Panama),
INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/acd-comments-onchanguinola-1-chan-75-large-hydro-project-panama-3157 (last visited May 14, 2014)
[hereinafter ACD Comments].
58
Id. In fact, based on a report provided in 2009 by Professor James Anaya, U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights asked the government to suspend the project during investigations, but the
government disregarded this request. Jennifer Kennedy, Damming the Ngäbe: Aftermath
of an AES Power Project in Panama, CORPWATCH, (Oct. 15, 2012),
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=15788 (last visited May 19, 2014).
59
John Ahni Schertow, UN ‘Clean Development’ Money Sought for Dam That Threatens
Indigenous People, INTERCONTINENTAL CRY, (Aug. 7, 2008),
http://intercontinentalcry.org/un-clean-development-money-sought-for-dam-thatthreatens-indigenous-people/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
60
Id. Some abuses that occurred include residents being induced to sign fraudulent
agreements that they did not understand since they were written in Spanish (a language
that the majority of Ngäbe do not read or write), and as a result their farms were
demolished. In addition, women, children, and the elderly were subject to acts of
violence. Id.
61
Kennedy, supra note 58.
62
Id.; see also Participative Resettlement, AES CHANGUINOLA,
http://www.aeschanguinola.com/eng/resettlement.asp (last visited May 14, 2014).
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Although the Ngäbe are not the only indigenous community to face
this type of challenge, their land is uniquely vulnerable because of its
history of repeated intrusion and appropriation by the government. 63
Moreover, the continued advancement of hydroelectric projects threatens
to consistently dimish the Ngäbe lands though the expropriation of
portions of their territory, which the government deems necessary to
accommodate these projects.64 Thus, it is imperative that projects like the
Barro Blanco are prevented to preserve the Ngäbe territory and to
preclude further diminution of their lands.
B.

Panama’s Quest for Modernization

Panama is one of Latin America’s fastest-growing economies. 65
Panama’s growth is being driven in part by construction of commercial and
residential real estate flowing from an influx of foreign funding. 66 With
increased economic development comes a demand for power to support
its growth. The demand for electricity stems predominantly from the
commercial sector.67 For example, the expansion of the Panama Canal 68
is one such project that is pushing Panama close to the limits of its energy
capacity. 69 Thus, in response to its increasing demand for energy,
Panama has agreed to commence numerous hydroelectric power

(discussing AES’s resettlement plans which failed to materialize in time to assist the
indigenous communities).
63
See Wickstrom, supra note 3, at 49-50.
64
See Purdy, supra note 52.
65
Andres Oppenheimer, Andres Oppenheimer: Latin America’s Fastest-Growing
Economies of 2013, MIAMI HERALD, (Apr. 24, 2013),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/04/24/3362939/andres-oppenheimer-latinamericas.html (last visited May 14, 2014).
66
Dire Straits, supra note 7, at 7.
67
Id.
68
See Ángel Ricardo Martínez, Panama: The Challenges Ahead, LATIN TRADE, (Feb. 13,
2013), http://latintrade.com/2013/02/panama-the-challenges-ahead (last visited May 19,
2014) (stating “[t]he construction of … the $5.2-billion Panama Canal expansion and a
$1.8-billion subway in the capital city, have boosted the country’s economy to 10.5
percent growth in 2012, slightly less than the 10.6 percent in 2010, and reduced
unemployment to 4.8 percent in 2012.”).
69
Swyter, supra note 19.
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projects. In fact, hydroelectric power generates sixty percent of the
nation’s electricity.70
Hydroelectric power or hydropower is a mechanism that creates
electricity through energy harvested from flowing water. 71 The most
common source of hydropower is dams, which use the water flowing
through its turbines to generate electricity. 72 There has been consistent
growth of Panama’s energy sector with hydropower playing a major role in
its expansion.73 In fact, Panama has hydropower investments totaling one
billion dollars with 95 percent of these projects located in the Chiriqui and
Bocas del Toro provinces.74 Barro Blanco is one of many dams proposed
by the Panamanian government.75
While hydropower projects promise to deliver additional sources of
clean energy amidst global climate change concerns, dams, in particular,
have catastrophic effects on rivers, the neighboring area, and on the
indigenous peoples residing there.76 According to the World Commission
on Dams (WCD), “[d]ams transform landscapes and create risks of
irreversible impacts.”77 WCD further noted that “the end of any dam project
must be the sustainable improvement of human welfare. This means a
significant advance of human development on a basis that is economically
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Hydropower, RENEWABLEENERGY.COM,
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http://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Hydropower_Ventures (last visited
May 19, 2014).
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http://www.internationalrivers.org/environmental-impacts-of-dams (last visited May 19,
2014); see also Aviva Imhof and Guy R. Lanza, Greenwashing Hydropower, 23
W ORLDW ATCH, (2010) at 7-8, available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6344 (last
visited May 19, 2014).
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viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.”78 Thus, dams
invading and destroying indigenous lands cannot be said to achieve these
ends completely.
First, the obvious effects of dams on the basic dynamics of rivers
cannot be overlooked. Free-flowing rivers are transformed into reservoirs
containing stagnant water thereby changing the temperature, chemical,
and physical composition of the water body. This essentially establishes a
new body of water which hosts non-native species, and destabilizes the
surrounding environmental community. 79
In addition, the river’s
downstream areas experience some of the most devastating
consequences since plants and wildlife can suffer a complete loss of
irrigation and water availability. Also, since the dam holds back sediment
used to replace the riverbeds downstream those areas are subject to
erosion, thus reducing fish habitats.80
Second, the negative impacts of dams on fish are also of
paramount importance. According to the WCD, “detailed studies in North
America indicate that dam construction is one of the major causes of
freshwater species extinction.” 81 As a physical barrier to movement, dams
prevent the migration patterns of several species of fish that move
upstream and downstream, like salmon and eels. Although mechanisms
such as fish passes82 help to mitigate the damage caused by dams, they
have been largely unsuccessful because the force of the current functions
as a navigation device on which the fish rely to determine which direction
they should travel. 83 As a result, dams also have severe social and
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economic impacts on fisheries and communities such as the Ngäbe that
depend exclusively on subsistence agriculture and fishing to survive.84
Finally, indigenous groups who benefit the least from hydropower
projects are disproportionately affected by the construction of dams. 85 As
a result of the sheer special requirements of such large-scale projects as
dams, indigenous communities are largely physically displaced. 86
Complete destruction of ancestral land further compounds the impact dam
construction has on the indigenous way of life.87 Moreover, since many
existing legal protections do little or nothing to preserve indigenous rights
to land, such displacement can activate a legal domino effect that
ultimately results in catastrophic results for indigenous communities who
may or may not have legal title to their territories. 88 Considering the
magnitude of damage caused by dams, the impending completion of
Barro Blanco contributes to the Ngäbe’s mounting trepidation concerning
the continued commencement of hydropower projects. 89
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Yet, in spite of the devastating effects of dams, hydropower
continues to be Panama’s preferred means of generating electricity
despite the availability of other sources of renewable energy. 90 In
addition, according to one study, the Chiriquí province has the highest
hydropower potential in Panama, which explains why developers so
heavily target Ngäbe lands.91 In fact, hydropower projects have greatly
exploited the area’s free-flowing rivers.92 According to one author, should
Panama succeed in completing all proposed hydro projects, none of
Panama’s rivers would be free flowing—all would be dammed.93
II.

EXISTING LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

International and domestic legal frameworks exist in Panama to
protect indigenous lands from exploitation. The international conventions
addressed in this article are the product of tireless efforts by various
entities such as indigenous groups and NGO’s in promoting the idea of
indigenous rights. 94 In addition, domestic law recognizes the rights of
indigenous communities’ collective ownership of land. 95 Despite these
protections, indigenous rights are often trampled when the interests of the
State or developers conflict with these rights.
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A.

Indigenous Rights Protections in International Law

There are two international law instruments dealing specifically with
indigenous rights—The International Labour Organization Convention
Number 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.96 These two sources
provide valuable protections for indigenous communities.
1. Panama’s Failure to Ratify International Labour
Organization Convention No. 169
International Labour Organization Convention Number 169 on
Indigenous and Tribal People (ILO 169) is “a legally binding international
instrument open to ratification that deals specifically with the rights of
indigenous and tribal peoples.”97 ILO 169 does not provide a definition of
indigenous peoples, but it does provide criteria that are helpful in
identifying the people ILO 169 protects.98 A revision of prior ILO 107, ILO
169 recognizes the “aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development and to
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions . . . ” 99
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See Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
adopted June 27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991)
, available at pmbl.
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A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). [hereinafter UNDRIP].
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2014).
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Currently, there are twenty-two countries that have ratified ILO 169, and
while Panama has promised to ratify ILO 169, to date it has not. 100
ILO 169’s predecessor, ILO 107, “was a first attempt to codify
international obligations of States in respect [to] indigenous and tribal
populations and was the first international convention on the subject[.]”101
However, ILO 107 “contain[ed] a fundamental flaw” in that it refers to
indigenous people as less advanced and that it promotes eventual
integration of the indigenous into the society at large rather than promoting
their right to self-determination.102 Although ILO 107 is no longer open to
ratification, it remains in force in eighteen countries—including Panama—
until these countries ratify ILO 169.103
One of the main differences between ILO 107 and ILO 169 is the
overall view of indigenous peoples in each instrument. ILO 107 was
developed with the understanding that indigenous communities were only
temporary and would eventually be integrated into society at large. 104 By
contrast, ILO 169 was drafted with the idea that indigenous peoples are
permanent societies and deserve communal lands. 105 This instrument
posits that indigenous communities have a right to survival and to
100

Panama Latest To Sign Up To Tribal Peoples’ Law, SURVIVAL, (Mar. 26, 2011),
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101
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(emphasis added); see KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS
DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY 36-37 (2010) (discussing the integration
aspect of ILO 107); see also Miranda, supra note 94, at 52 (discussing that the concept
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determine their own progression. 106 Along with land rights, ILO 169
recognizes the right of indigenous people to be engaged in decisions
affecting their lands. 107 Article 6 of ILO 169, which has been called the
“heart of the convention,” 108 provides,
In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments
shall: (a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through their representative
institutions, whenever consideration is being given to
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them
directly; (b) establish means by which these peoples can
freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors
of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective
institutions and administrative and other bodies responsible
for policies and programmes which concern them; (c)
establish means for the full development of these peoples'
own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate cases
provide the resources necessary for this purpose. The
consultations carried out in application of this Convention
shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement
or consent to the proposed measures. 109
Under Article 6 of ILO 169, Panama would have a legal obligation to
actively engage the Ngäbe in discussions regarding any projects affecting
their comarca.
Conversely, Article 12 of ILO 107, while acknowledging that people
such as the Ngäbe may already occupy land identified for development
and obligating the government to obtain free consent from the community
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prior to removal, leaves room for the government to take the lands.110 It
indicates instances where indigenous peoples may be removed without
free consent, which includes if the displacement is in the interest of
economic development. 111 Article 12 of ILO 107 further states that if
indigenous peoples are removed from the lands, the country is obligated
to either find them a suitable replacement or provide full compensation for
the loss of land and any resulting injury. 112
While Article 12 of ILO 107 may appear to protect indigenous
communities and provides suitable alternatives for their survival, it does
not. It directly undermines their existence by presuming these people can
simply be relocated to other areas.113 The term indigenous signifies that
communities like the Ngäbe are spiritually connected to their lands
because their ancestral roots are embedded in the land on which they live,
which distinguishes them from the community at large. 114 Thus, relocation
is not an appropriate alternative given their inextricable connection to their
land. Other significant provisions of ILO 169 further advance this
understanding of indigenous and safeguard indigenous territories by
acknowledging that indigenous people have the right to be actively
engaged in any decision affecting their lands. 115
According to Professor S. James Anaya, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People,
[A]n important advancement for the recognition of the rights
of indigenous peoples would be the ratification of
International Labour Organization Convention No. 169
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries. Panama is one of the few countries in Latin
America that has not yet ratified the Convention. Convention
No. 169 is an instrument that compliments the United
110
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples . . .
.116
Given the tremendous benefit ILO 169 provides to indigenous peoples,
ILO 169’s ratification would demonstrate Panama’s commitment to
protecting its indigenous communities’ culture and right of selfdetermination.
2. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples
In addition to ILO 169, indigenous peoples enjoy protections
afforded by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), which declares inter alia that states shall consult with
and obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous
communities before making any decision affecting their lands. 117
“UNDRIP represents a shift away from th[e] [state-centered] approach [of
indigenous rights], promoting a more inclusive and consultative
relationship with indigenous people.” 118
This initiative to develop a system of safeguards specific to
indigenous communities consumed over two decades of negotiation
because states were wary of adopting new standards that would preserve
an indigenous right of self-determination and be a key part of the decisionmaking process concerning the use of their lands and the natural
resources contained therein.119 Nevertheless, UNDRIP was adopted by
the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2006. 120 Unlike ILO
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169, Panama is a signatory to this declaration and is bound by its
terms.121
One of the most controversial aspects of UNDRIP is the duty of the
state to obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous
community before approving any project affecting their land or
resources.122 According to one author, one of the reasons
why these matters are deemed so sensitive is that, at
present, one of the major threats to the physical and cultural
survival of indigenous peoples lies in the increasing focus on
so-called ‘under-developed regions which overlap with
indigenous areas, in order to extract natural resources,
establish industrial plants and build dams[.]”123
For this reason, UNDRIP’s protections create a tension between
the interest of indigenous peoples and the state’s interest in economic
development.124 In fact, the concept of free, prior, and informed consent is
pervasive throughout UNDRIP: “no relocation shall take place without free,
prior, and informed consent;”125 “state shall consult and cooperate in good
faith…in order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent;” 126 ”states
shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent
process[.]”127
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Free indicates that indigenous peoples must be free from force,
coercion, intimidation, or manipulation by the government or company. 128
The term prior represents that the government must seek approval from
the indigenous community prior to appropriating their land and prior to the
commencement of any project affecting those lands. 129 Informed signifies
that the government must give the indigenous community all the
information needed to make an informed decision. 130 In addition, the
government must provide information in a language that they can
understand, through means that they can readily employ, and include
access to independent information and experts on law and technical
issues.131
While UNDRIP provides a powerful set of protections for
indigenous peoples, unlike treaties which are binding on all its parties,
U.N. Declarations are a type of soft law that are not legally binding. 132
Yet, while a state may not have a legally binding obligation, it is arguable
that indigenous protections under UNDRIP may be considered customary
international law, considering a substantial number of member states
agree to its objectives.133 In addition, UNDRIP has tremendous support
from member states, indigenous communities, and NGO’s who recognize
the need for the human rights protections contained in the instrument.134
For states like Panama who are signatories to UNDRIP, it also represents
to the world a moral commitment to uphold the principles of the
declaration.135

128

CHRISTINA HILL, ET AL., GUIDE TO FREE PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT 8 (2010),
available at http://resources.oxfam.org.au/pages/view.php?ref=528 (last visited May 19,
2014).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 79 (2009).
133
Id.
134
See generally THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES W ITH AN INTRODUCTION FOR INDIGENOUS LEADERS IN THE UNITED STATES,
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAW AND POLICY PROGRAM (2012), available
at http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/data/UNDRIP-Handbook-USA.pdf (last visited May
19, 2014).
135
Id.

568

B.

Panama’s Protections of Indigenous Rights

Panama is recognized as having a superior legal framework of
indigenous peoples’ protections. 136 As compared to neighboring countries
whose legal frameworks are still developing, as a general matter,
Panama’s laws reflect a commitment to indigenous territorial ownership
and autonomy. 137 However, even with a framework recognized as
“innovative and effective, respectful of indigenous autonomy and
supportive of community initiative,”138 Panama falls short by not ratifying
ILO 169, a treaty that neighboring Costa Rica has already ratified.139
Despite its commitment to indigenous peoples’ protections,
Panama’s legal framework is nonetheless inadequate to ensure that
indigenous rights are respected because Panama’s laws contain
disparities between government authority over protected lands and
indigenous rights to control their lands.140 Moreover, government conflict
with indigenous peoples is commonplace. 141 Enforcement of indigenous
rights in Panama is weak, which allows the government to continue its
abuses.142 In fact, the absence of enforcement coupled with the nation’s
zealous pursuit of development enable the exploitation of indigenous
lands and perpetuation of human rights abuses. 143 By undermining the
laws it established for indigenous protection, Panama has demonstrated
indifference toward their indigenous communities, thereby contributing to
the Ngäbe’s loss of territory.
For example, while Ley 10’s passage was enormous step forward,
additional lands were supposed to be annexed to the Ngäbe people at a
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later time. 144 According to the text of Ley 10, the government was to
demarcate these lands within two years of the law’s passage. 145 To date,
the lands have not been annexed to the Ngäbe people. 146 In fact, while
Ley 10 appears to grant the Ngäbe exclusive control over their land,
controversy exists as to whether their authority extends to the natural
resources located on the land. 147
Significant gaps in protection exist in Ley 10 because while the
Ngäbe possess collective ownership of the land, the Panamanian
government still retains the authority to authorize its use for purposes such
as hydropower projects, thereby creating a usufructuary arrangement
rather than a formal titling of land. 148 However, Article 127 of the Panama
Constitution guarantees land reservation to indigenous peoples of
Panama to ensure their social and economic well-being. 149 In addition,
according to Article 48, there should be no expropriation of indigenous
lands outside of special proceedings in a court of law.150 Thus, while the
government has an interest in indigenous lands, that interest is, to a
certain degree, subject to indigenous rights granted by the Panamanian
government.
144
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By contrast, subsequent legislation passed in Panama permits the
government to exploit indigenous lands in favor of continued development.
Further underscoring the severity of Panama’s indifference toward
indigenous rights was the passage of Ley 18 de 2003, repealing key
indigenous protections that existed in Panama Ley 41 de 1998 (Ley 41). 151
Ley 41, Panama’s General Environmental Law, contained critical
safeguards for indigenous communities that mirrored the free, prior, and
informed consent provisions present in ILO 169 and UNDRIP.
However, Ley 41’s essential provisions—Articles 63, 96, 98, 101,
and 102—were abolished by Ley 18 de 2003 leaving Panama’s
indigenous people vulnerable to infringements on their land rights and
right to self-determination. 152 Article 63 of Ley 41 required indigenous
participation in the protection and conservation of the comarca lands.153
Article 96 provided that Panama’s environmental authority would consult
with indigenous authorities on all matters concerning the environment and
natural resources on their lands. 154 Articles 98 and 101 reinforced the
requirement of consultation with the appropriate indigenous authority
concerning use of comarca lands for industrial or commercial purposes. 155
Article 102 stipulated that lands within the comarcas were inalienable,
notwithstanding the traditional system of land conveyance within
indigenous communities, and that the government can only remove
indigenous peoples from their lands with their prior consent.156 Thus, the
elimination of these critical provisions of Ley 41 in 2003 permitted
concessions for projects like Barro Blanco to begin and signaled the
continued expropriation of Ngäbe lands.
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THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM

III.

The hydropower projects mentioned in this article were initiated
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. 157
The CDM seeks to promote sustainable development; however, what was
established to provide a sustainable solution to climate change has
inadvertently created an environmental regulatory framework that leaves
indigenous communities vulnerable to the objectives of host countries and
developers.158
A.

The Clean Development Mechanism Framework

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was created in 1992 for states to collectively examine how
best to mitigate the effects of climate change in the world. 159 According to
the UNFCCC, climate change is a serious problem requiring developed
countries to take the lead in mitigating the effects of greenhouse gas
emissions (GHGs) by providing financial assistance to developing nations
in their effort to lower GHGs. 160 Structurally, the UNFCCC defines the
convention’s fundamental objectives and divides countries into annexes
based on the countries socio-economic status (Annex I and Non-Annex I
Developing Nations). 161
157

See ACD Comments, supra note 57; see also Project 3237, supra note 17.
See generally RANDALL SPALDING-FECHER, ET. AL., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE CLEAN
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 48 (2012) available at
http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_impact.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
159
Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION IN CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited May 15, 2014)
[hereinafter Background]; see also Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php
(last visited May 15, 2014) (showing 195 parties to the UNFCCC and 165 signatories;
Panama signed the UNFCCC on March 18, 1993, ratified it on May 23, 1995, and it
entered into force on August 21, 1995).
160
First Steps to a Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php (last visited May 15,
2014).
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FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: A
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In 1997, responding to the deficiencies of provisions for emission
reductions in the UNFCCC, the states adopted the Kyoto Protocol to
strengthen the global response to climate change.162 Panama is a party to
the Kyoto Protocol and is classified as a Non-Annex I developing
country.163 The Kyoto Protocol is the vehicle through which the goals of
the UNFCCC are realized. 164 “It commits industrialized countries to
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions based on the principles of the
Convention. The Convention itself only encourages countries to do so.”165
Under the Kyoto Protocol countries are required to meet emissions
reduction targets by pre-established “commitment periods” through any of
three market-based mechanisms: International Emissions Trading, Joint
Implementation, and Clean Development Mechanism. 166
The principle goals of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms are to
stimulate sustainable development through technology
transfer and investment, help countries with Kyoto
commitments to meet their targets by reducing emissions or
removing carbon from the atmosphere in other countries in a
162

Background, supra note 159; see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.
163
Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php
(last visited May 15, 2014) (showing 192 state ratifications to date; Panama signed the
Kyoto Protocol on June 8, 1998, ratified it on Mar. 5, 1999 and it entered into force on
Feb. 16, 2005).
164
Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php (last visited May
15, 2014).
165
Id. [emphasis added]; see Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited May 15,
2014) (listing the target regulated gases under the Kyoto Protocol as: carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC’s),
perfluorocarbons (PFC’s); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6); see also Kyoto Protocol,
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited May 15, 2014) (“recognizing
that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG
emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the
Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of ‘common
but differentiated responsibilities.’”).
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Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited May 15, 2014).

573

cost-effective way, and to encourage the private sector and
developing countries to contribute to emission reduction
efforts.167
These mechanisms have created what is known as the carbon market
driven in part by the CDM, which involves “investment in sustainable
projects that reduce emissions in developing countries.”168
Created by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM allows
countries with emission-reduction or emission-limitation mandates under
the Kyoto Protocol to undertake an emission-reduction project in
developing countries (like Panama). 169 For every ton of carbon dioxide
(CO2), the projects can earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits,
which the countries can sell and also count towards meeting their targets
under the Kyoto Protocol. 170 In short, it forms a cap and trade system
designed to encourage climate change mitigating projects in exchange for
credit, thereby creating tangible assets with market value. 171
The Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol has full
authority over and makes rules and regulations concerning the CDM. 172
An Executive Board supervises the CDM, and is responsible for
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The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited May 15, 2014).
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Id.
169
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.
php (last visited May 15, 2014).
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Id.
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YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra note 161, at 160; see also James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 616
(2000), defining “cap and trade” as a market-based emissions reduction approach by
which desirable levels of aggregate emissions are established for certain pollutants.
Regulators determine a formula for allocation of acceptable emissions levels among
emitters and issue permits to emitters entitling them to emit a given quantity of that
pollutant. The desired effect is that the total quantity of emissions allowed equals the
maximum level set by policymakers thereby causing emitters to lower their emissions.
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Governance, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/governance.html (last visited May 15, 2014).
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overseeing all activities related to the CDM. 173 Although the Executive
Board maintains separate panels to assist in CDM operations and
ministerial functions, it remains fully accountable to the Conference of the
Parties (COP).174 The CDM Modalities and Procedures, which govern the
CDM, sets forth the rules and procedures by which the COP and
Executive Board will approve and regulate CDM projects.175
B.

The CDM Project Cycle

There are seven steps in the project cycle of a CDM initiative: (1)
project design preparation and submission of the proposed project; (2)
national approval from the host country; (3) validation from a private thirdparty certifier; (4) registration of the project once accepted by the
Executive Board; (5) monitoring actual emissions; (6) verification and
certification that actual emissions reduction took place; and (7) issuing the
CER credit. 176 During steps one through four, the planning phase, the
project participant must meet three substantive requirements for the
Designated Operational Entity to submit the project to the Executive Board
for registration—a letter of approval from the Designated National
Authority of the host country, 177 the Project Design Document; 178 and a
validation report from the Designated Operational Entity.179
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference
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for participation in the CDM, is an organization responsible for approving CDM projects
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The development of the Project Design Document requires certain
information be included within the document and submitted to the
Designated Operational Entity (DOE)—particularly, a description of the
environmental impacts of the project and a summary of stakeholder
comments. 180 The CDM Modalities and Procedures require the project
participants consult with stakeholders during the planning phase as part of
the Project Design Document (PDD) and it must occur in order for a
project to be validated. 181 The manual specifies that project participants
must request stakeholder comments, provide the stakeholder comments
to the Executive Board, and include an explanation of how the project
accounts for those comments.182 However, the manual does not specify

has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, its participation is voluntary, and that the project
contributes to sustainable development.).
178
YAMIN & DEPLEDGE, supra note 161, at 178.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
"Stakeholders" means the public, including individuals, groups or communities
affected, or likely to be affected, by the proposed clean development mechanism project
activity. CDM Modalities & Procedures, supra note 175, at § P 1(e).
182
Id. at P 37(b); The CDM also requires that projects meet the requirement of
additionality during the validation phase. The text of Article 12 § 5(c) of the Kyoto
Protocol requires “reductions in emissions [to be] additional to any that would occur in the
absence of the certified project activity.” This simply means that GHG emissions, after
implementation of the project, must be lower than those that would have occurred in the
absence of the new project—it must not be “business as usual;” see generally Barbara
Haya and Payal Parekh, Hydropower in the CDM: Examining Additionality and Criteria for
Sustainability, (Energy and Resources Group Working Paper ERG-11-001, 2011),
available at
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/Haya%20Parekh-2011Hydropower%20in%20the%20CDM.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014) (demonstrating that
hydropower projects (large and small) backed aggressively by host countries are
common and as a result fail to meet the additionality standard). Article 12 § 5(c) of the
Kyoto Protocol requires “reductions in emissions [to be] additional to any that would occur
in the absence of the certified project activity.” This simply means that GHG emissions,
after implementation of the project, must be lower than those that would have occurred in
the absence of the new project—it must not be “business as usual.” Barbara Haya &
Payal Parekh, Hydropower in the CDM: Examining Additionality and Criteria for
Sustainability, (Nov. 2011), available at
http://erg.berkeley.edu/working_paper/2011/Haya%20Parekh-2011Hydropower%20in%20the%20CDM.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014). Although lack of
additionality presents another issue for indigenous peoples, an in-depth discussion of that
issue is outside the scope of this article.
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how the project participant should elicit stakeholder comments and what
measures are sufficient to meet this requirement. 183
The stakeholder commenting period is thirty days from the date of
the PDD’s posting on the CDM website. 184 During this brief period,
indigenous peoples and other affected parties are required to voice their
concerns or disapproval of the proposed project. 185 Yet, the project
participant is only required to post the PDD in English, and there is no
guarantee that indigenous people are even aware that the PDD is
available for review since most, if not all, do not have access to the
internet.186
During validation, an independent evaluation of the project is
measured against CDM requirements as set forth in the CDM Modalities
and Procedures and any relevant Kyoto Protocol and Executive Board
decisions. 187 Furthermore, the evaluator should verify, among other
things, that the stakeholder consultation requirement was actually met. 188
Once validation is completed—and if the project complies with the CDM
Modalities and Procedures—the Executive Board accepts the project and
registers it as a CDM project. 189
The CDM Validation and Verification Manual requires the DOE to
assess the steps taken by the developer to notify stakeholders, but it fails
to provide explicit instruction to the DOE as to what steps are adequate
and appropriate. 190 In fact, the manual indicates that the DOE must
183
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See Exec. Bd. of the Clean Dev. Mechanism, Fifty-Fifth Meeting Report, Annex 1,
Clean Development Mechanism Validation and Verification Manual, Version 05.0, §7.14.
(Feb. 1, 2013) [hereinafter VVM], available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/e/x/t/extfile20131010181547796accr_stan02.pdf/accr_stan02.pdf?t=cDJ8bjQxbWxofDD8SNKUjd2BjlqNP7lv7I3 (last
184

577

determine whether the project participants invited stakeholder comments
through document review and interviews when appropriate. 191 However,
the instructions are silent as to how far the DOE must go in making this
determination since the manual also states that the DOE is not required to
communicate with the stakeholders who comment; though, the DOE must
account for their comments in its report.192
After the project passes validation, it is then subject to ongoing
monitoring of actual emissions and an additional verification, which is an
independent review and determination that any GHG reductions are
authentic; then, once verification is complete, the project is certified.193 To
verify authenticity, the reviewer uses a combination of tools, which
includes “conduct[ing] on-site inspections, as appropriate, that may
comprise, inter alia, a review of performance records, interviews with
project participants and local stakeholders . . . .”194 Although, the reviewer
may contact local stakeholders, there is no requirement that they do
because the main focus of this verification process is to ensure that
carbon reductions occurred, not to ensure compliance with domestic and
international law or to hear indigenous concerns regarding violation of
their rights.195 Moreover, once a project is registered, there is no means to
de-register a project that violates international or domestic law. 196
Therefore, it is imperative that stakeholders have a voice early in the CDM
project cycle to prevent a project that violates human rights from going
forward.
Once the project participant receives certification, they may then
submit a request for issuance of the CER credit, which is also subject to
an additional verification-type procedure. 197 Yet even within these
processes, there is no assurance that indigenous voices will be heard. In
visited May 19, 2014) s. (outlining the DOE’s steps in validation that local stakeholder
consultation took place).
191
Id. at 7.14, 7.5.
192
Id. at 7.14, 7.5.
193
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fact, the CDM project cycle does not contain a complaint mechanism,
leaving a significant void for the defense of human rights.198 Although an
appeals process currently exists, it is only open for the purpose of
appealing denial of registration and is narrowly applied. 199 The appeals
process only extends to certain participants like the project developers
and does not include indigenous groups or their advocates wanting to
appeal the registration of a project for human rights violations. 200
Consequently, once a project has officially been registered under the
CDM, the possibility of indigenous voices being heard is effectively
foreclosed without access to justice built into the project cycle.
IV.

PROPOSAL TO ENHANCE INDIGENOUS RIGHTS UNDER THE CDM

Since domestic protections are weak and international protections
have gone unheeded, adding enhanced accountability measures to the
CDM Modalities and Procedures will help protect indigenous communities.
Procedural safeguards can effectively mitigate the harm caused to
indigenous peoples by placing roadblocks to registration if states and
developers do not adhere to legal protections. Additionally, in order to
provide a voice to the public at large, an access to justice mechanism
available throughout the CDM project cycle would provide an additional
layer of accountability that does not currently exist. Finally, the inclusion of
indigenous knowledge during a project’s planning phase could provide
valuable solutions thereby assisting the host country in meeting its needs
while respecting indigenous rights.
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A.

Develop Validation,
Safeguards

Verification,

and

Certification

The hydropower projects addressed in this article were registered
under the CDM. While there are several factors at play when choosing a
host country, the most important determinant should be the country’s
mitigation potential as this forms the basis for the award of CER credits. 201
Nevertheless, as a small developing nation with relatively small mitigation
potential, Panama has benefitted greatly from the CDM as an attractive
host country because it has a very good investment climate. 202
In addition, the revenue generated by CDM-registered projects
provides a major incentive to host countries such as Panama to
aggressively advance hydropower projects like Barro Blanco.203 Despite
the international and domestic protections discussed earlier in this article,
Panama has disregarded the Ngäbe right of self-determination in favor of
modernization by failing to adequately consult the Ngäbe regarding the
Barro Blanco and other projects. 204 Their actions have placed the Ngäbe
in jeopardy of losing their land and culture; therefore, measures must be
taken to strongly discourage any further expropriation of Ngäbe lands.205
Contrary to UNDRIP, Panama failed to engage the Ngäbe with
regard to the Barro Blanco project.206 According to an indigenous leader
201
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of M10, the Ngäbe were not consulted about the Barro Blanco dam prior
to its approval.207 Moreover, the Ngäbe were not invited to a public forum
to discuss the dam. Of the people who were consulted, none was Ngäbe
or even representatives of Ngäbe interests.208 Ngäbe resistance to these
projects has often been met with violence from the local government. 209
The Barro Blanco and other hydroelectric projects (Tabasara I and Chan
75) were all approved without prior consultation as required by
UNDRIP.210 Thus, Panama failed to meet the standard of free, prior, and
informed consent as set forth in UNDRIP and, as a result, the Ngäbe have
suffered tremendously in furtherance of Barro Blanco’s construction. 211
To assist in preventing future human rights abuses, there are a few
areas in the validation process where precautionary measures, if taken,
would simultaneously preserve indigenous rights and provide economic
feasibility to host countries and developers. First, mandating compliance
with international and domestic law as a prerequisite for registration under
the CDM would add a human rights dimension to the process that does
not currently exist. This type of enhancement has been referred to as a
rights-based approach to climate change mitigation and is strongly
advocated for by top scholars.212 In fact, the World Bank has recognized
the role human rights play in development and that their policies should
to-investigate-human-rights-violations-caused-by-panamas-barro-blanco-dam/ (last
visited May 19, 2014).
207
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208
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209
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(Panama), supra note 54; see also Letter from Danielle Hirsch, Director, Both ENDS to
Mr. Nanno Kleitorp, Director FMO (Oct. 25, 2013), available at
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/131025_FMO-N.Kleiterp_FMO-support-for-Barro-Blanco_FINAL.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014) (urging
FMO to revoke financing for Barro Blanco from GENISA because GENISA did not
properly consult the Ngäbe, which contravened FMO’s policy not to infringe on human
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211
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2014).
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consider human rights as part of its decision-making process.213 Likewise,
allowing human rights to inform the CDM approval process would make
great strides in advancing the cause of indigenous peoples all over the
world.
As part of the planning phase of the project, DOE should be
required to conduct an in-depth analysis of existing international and
domestic laws implicated by the proposed project. This proposed review is
similar to the DOE’s already-required review of the project against CDM
requirements as set forth in the CDM Modalities and Procedures and any
relevant Kyoto Protocol and Executive Board decisions.
Conformity with international conventions and relevant domestic
law is essential for indigenous communities to receive a meaningful
opportunity to preserve their lands. It has been suggested that project
developers include a statement that the project is not the subject of any
adverse decision of domestic or international courts when submitting a
project for validation. 214 While this measure could make some impact on
registration, by having project developers supply the information it places
the burden on the participant—who has a pecuniary interest in registration
of the project—rather than requiring this step to be included in the DOE’s
independent review.
Second, effectively defining the scope of stakeholder consultation
would ensure that indigenous groups and other concerned parties such as
NGO’s receive adequate consultation and have a meaningful opportunity
to participate in any development affecting indigenous lands.215 The CDM
Modalities & Procedures and the Validation and Verification Manual do not
define the scope of stakeholder consultation with specificity; thus the lack
of clearly delineated consultation procedures for such a significant and
crucial step in the CDM process marks a blatant weakness in the
213
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guidelines of the CDM that demands immediate consideration and
revision. 216 The lack of procedures governing stakeholder consultation
essentially grants host countries and developers carte blanche in the CDM
project cycle that stakeholders cannot challenge effectively because
specific instructions for adequate stakeholder consultation do not exist.
Conversely, host countries and developers are susceptible to ensuing
litigation resulting from the absence of clear consultation guidelines.
Finally, expanding the thirty-day stakeholder commenting period to
include a notice period prior to commencement of the commenting period
and requiring that project participants post PDD’s in the languages of the
host country and affected indigenous communities would add an extra
layer to the stakeholder consultation requirement prior to validation.
Imposing a mandate requiring that project developers provide sufficient
proof that affected stakeholders actually received notification would
require project developers to employ more than one tool to adequately
notify indigenous communities and their supporters of a potential project.
Other means of contact should include hand delivery of the PDD to
representatives of the indigenous community and notification by way of email and certified mail to supporting organizations. Additionally, failure to
substantiate actual notice to affected stakeholders would halt validation,
thereby placing another roadblock to registration until project developers
comply. To developers, project suspension could result in increased
construction charges and costly project delays; however, it also provides
an important budgetary safeguard for developers as they receive some
level of assurance that so long as they are in compliance their projects will
not be hindered.
B.

Incorporate an Access to Justice Mechanism into the
CDM Project Cycle

In addition to adding more defined and closely scrutinized
prerequisites to registration, there must also be access to justice for
indigenous communities and other affected parties seeking to register
complaints against CDM project participants who violate human rights. If
human rights violations associated with a CDM project are disregarded
216

Id.
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pre-registration, post-registration, or at any point in the project cycle,
under the current structure, indigenous peoples have no way to ensure
that these violations will be addressed or that violators are subject to
adverse action such as sanctions or de-registration of their projects.
As previously discussed, Barro Blanco has already been registered
under the CDM and, consequently, since the Ngäbe have no alternative
means of recourse, they resorted to organized demonstrations to express
their dissent, which has led to bloodshed and death when law
enforcement acted to silence their outrage. 217 Without a mechanism to
register complaints, the CDM project cycle renders indigenous peoples
like the Ngäbe vulnerable to human rights abuses because host countries
and developers are free to continue their practices with no accountability
or consequences for their actions. Several organizations have petitioned
for this enhancement to the CDM project cycle and for revision of the CDM
Modalities and Procedures to include access to justice, yet no affirmative
measures have been taken to ensure that indigenous voices are heard
post-registration.218
Making continued registration contingent on continued compliance
with international and domestic law provides a powerful backdrop of
security for indigenous peoples so that communities like the Ngäbe would
not be forced to resort to protests as their only avenue to voice
complaints. In furtherance of the right of self-determination present in
UNDRIP, it is essential that indigenous groups have unlimited access to
opportunities to legally defend their rights when infringed upon by the
government or other actors.
C.

Harnessing Indigenous Knowledge as a Means of
Inclusion and Participation

Indigenous peoples are known to be responsible stewards of their
land, which “reflects a distinctive land ethic” separate from and superior to
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the modern view of land as a commodity.219 Building on this environmental
ethic, harnessing indigenous knowledge of the environment is a way in
which states and developers can invite the participation of indigenous
communities in land development projects that concern the nation’s
population at large, while remaining sensitive to the surrounding
indigenous culture and responsibly developing solutions to the nation’s
problems.220
While hydropower projects appear to alleviate Panama’s electricity
concerns, they simultaneously destroy the surrounding ecosystem,
displace indigenous communities, and have been initiated without
indigenous consultation and consent, which severely undermines their
right to self-determination. Additionally, though international and domestic
law mandate respect for indigenous lands, indigenous rights in Panama
have been outweighed by Panamanian interest in the Panama Canal’s
expansion and other prospects of Panama’s continued modernization and
economic prosperity. 221
Despite the popularity of hydropower in Panama, research has
uncovered instances of indigenous knowledge contributing to the
implementing of wind energy as an alternative to hydropower. 222 As
repositories of environmental knowledge, indigenous communities in
countries such as the United States have been able to work together with
the government and developers to institute projects that would accomplish
219
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the nation’s objectives while preserving the indigenous group’s culture and
way of life.223 In fact, the Cree Nation of Canada created Voices from the
Bay, an indigenous knowledge study, which memorializes in writing,
indigenous environmental practices and is relayed to policy-makers and
scientists as part of environmental assessments conducted in the area. 224
Initiatives advanced by indigenous groups have also received recognition
and won prizes for innovation.225 Examples such as these are illustrative
of the valuable contributions indigenous people add to climate change
mitigation efforts because of their ancient connection to their land.
Moreover, because of these connections, they are able to ensure their
continued survival, thus preserving their culture.226
In a recent report, Mr. S. James Anaya, United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, suggested that the
inclusion of indigenous knowledge and enterprise furthers the indigenous
right to self-determination by allowing the communities to determine the
most beneficial means of development and management of natural
resources.227 Accordingly, adding this dimension as a crucial part of the
consultation process could produce thoughtful, innovative, and even
traditional methods of resolving climate change mitigation issues.
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Furthermore, inclusion of indigenous knowledge creates a partnership
between the government and indigenous people that is mutually beneficial
and sustainable.
Environmental activist, Raúl Montenegro stated, “[i]ndigenous
peoples living on their ancestral lands can help industrialized countries by
living in a sustainable manner (not the contrary). If we destroy their
environments and communities, we will lose the answers they have to
solving our problems, and to the protection of our common futures.” 228
Adding the inclusion of indigenous knowledge to the stakeholder comment
and participation period would demonstrate an intentional commitment of
the international community to embracing human rights and environmental
preservation as their core initiative.
CONCLUSION
The Ngäbe’s struggle with hydropower development is not an
isolated problem; other developing nations have imperiled their indigenous
in pursuit of modernization. However, the Ngäbe lands are consistently
targeted for development to the extent that their collective lands have
diminished over time, thereby threatening their continued survival. Despite
this fact, Panama moves forward with a series of hydroelectric projects
that will further reduce Ngäbe lands.
Although ILO 169, UNDRIP, and domestic law mandate free, prior,
and informed consent when making decisions concerning indigenous
lands, Panama and Barro Blanco’s developers have disregarded this
obligation since this project continues to be registered under the CDM.
Thus, while international and domestic indigenous protections are
paramount to establishing the rights of indigenous people, enhancing the
CDM project cycle with procedural safeguards provides a fail-safe
approach to protecting those rights and preserving indigenous culture.
Specifically defining the scope of stakeholder consultation and
expanding the thirty-day commenting period would give indigenous
communities like the Ngäbe an equitable opportunity to voice any
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concerns about or disagreement with a project affecting their territories.
Moreover, access to justice must be available during the planning phase
of the project. Indigenous people are fully capable of determining what is
in their best interests for their continued survival. To that end, any project
not achieving this goal must yield to indigenous rights so as not to trample
them.
Although this article advocates on behalf of indigenous peoples’
rights, the solutions proposed in this article would not benefit indigenous
communities alone. Placing procedural safeguards early in the CDM
process would allow developers and states to avoid cost overruns due to
halted projects and costly litigation. Also, enhancing consultation and
participation measures to include indigenous knowledge fosters a
community of inclusion, mutual respect, and collaboration, ensuring
climate change mitigation efforts are met in a responsible manner.
Accordingly, these remedies would not only add increased credibility to
the registration process, but would establish accountability measures that
would safeguard human rights and ensure the viability of sustainable
projects.
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